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Abstract: The aim of this special issue is to widen the existing debates on security 
privatization by looking at how and why an increasing number of private actors beyond 
private military and/or security companies (PMSCs) have come to perform various security 
related functions. While PMSCs produce security for profit, most other private sector actors 
make profit by selling goods and services that were originally not connected with security in 
the traditional understanding of the term. However, due to the continuous introduction of 
new legal and technical regulations by public authorities, many non- security related private 
businesses nowadays have to perform at least some security functions. Little research, 
however, has been done thus far, both in terms of security practices of non- security related 
private businesses and their impact on security governance. This introduction explains how 
this special issues contributes to closing this glaring gap by 1) extending the conceptual and 
theoretical arguments in the existing body of literature; and 2) offering a range of original 
case studies on the specific roles of non- security related private companies of all sizes, areas 
of businesses, and geographic origin. 
 
Introduction to the Activities of the Non-Security Related Private Companies 
Experts in several academic disciplines have already investigated the growing role of private 
companies in the provision of security (Abrahamsen & Williams 2011; Boerzel & Risse 2006; 
Dunn-Cavelty & Kristensen 2008; Krahmann 2005; Müller-Wille 2004; Parker & Taylor 2010; 
                                                          
1 The editors of this special issue would like to thank the British International Studies Association for its support 
in the development of this project, in particular for the funding of the kick-start workshop in June 2015 in 
London. They would also like to thank all the participants in that workshop for their excellent contributions. 
Finally, they would also like to thank Raphael Bossong, Asne Aarstad and Gilles Biaumet for their insightful 
comments, which considerable contributed to the development of this introductory article. Corresponding 
author for this article: Helena Carrapico, h.farrand-carrapico@aston.ac.uk.  
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Petersen 2013; Shearing & Wood 2003; Webber et al. 2004; Wood & Dupont 2006). 
Empirically, this topic can be found in the recent literature in International Relations, 
Security Studies, Criminology, and Sociology. A substantial part of this literature, however, 
focuses only on those private actors that sell various security services for profit as the 
primary line of their business – e.g. the private military and/or security companies (PMSCs). 
The usage of PMSCs increased exponentially in the past two decades to complement 
traditional military forces in conflict scenarios, as well as domestic forces in ensuring law and 
order. Examples of such PMSCs include, for instance the British company Aegis Defence 
Services, which was contracted by the US department of Defense to provide support in the 
Iraq and Afghanistan wars (Ortiz, 2007), and the American company G4S plc, whose services 
are now widely widespread at airports, land borders, ports, financial institutions, 
governmental institutions, industry, and prisons (Leander, 2013). In order to convey an 
overall impression of the vast scope and scale of private security provision, it is worth noting 
that the massive use of PMSCs in recent armed conflicts prompted one informed observer to 
conclude that “[t]he private sector is so firmly embedded in combat, occupation and 
peacekeeping duties that the phenomenon may have reached the point of no return: even 
the US military would struggle to wage war without it” (Traynor 2003). In other words, the 
much-cited Weberian definition of the Westphalian state as the only human community that 
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory, no longer reflects the realities of many contemporary armed conflicts. Given the 
focus of this special issue, however, there is neither the space nor the need for a 
comprehensive review of this literature (for further analyses of PMSCs, please see Avant 
2004; Chesterman and Lehnardt 2007; Jäger and Kümmel 2007; Ortiz 2010; Percy 2007; 
Singer 2003). 
As mentioned above, given that the existing literature focuses primarily on those private 
actors that sell various security services for profit as their primary line of business, it neglects 
the mushrooming security practices of various non- security related private businesses (e.g. 
financial institutions, transportation companies, utility services providers, and infrastructure 
owners/operators), which make profit by selling goods and services that unrelated with 
security in the traditional understanding of the term. Thus, the primary aim of this special 
issue is to widen the existing debates on security privatization by looking at how and why an 
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increasing number of private actors beyond PMSCs have come to perform various security-
related functions. As editors, we believe that adopting a broader perspective, beyond private 
military companies, contributes to our understanding of the subject by permitting the 
individual contributors to this special issue to develop ground-breaking work by, firstly, 
exploring a range of case studies pointing out the growing presence of the private sector in 
security-related activities and critical infrastructures, and the consequent transfer of security 
responsibilities from the public sector to the non-security related private sector. Secondly, 
we specifically asked the contributors to draw upon their diverse disciplinary expertise and 
focus on possible ways to approach the conceptualization of the various security roles and 
practices of non- security related businesses.  
In order to ensure unity of purpose, a special issue meeting was held in June 2015 in the 
context of a one-day workshop at the British International Studies Association annual 
convention. The objectives of the workshop were to 1) map the extent to which security is 
being outsourced to private companies beyond PMSCs; 2) assess the social, political and 
economic consequences of the way security provision is evolving; and 3) explore the 
plausible conceptual and theoretical frameworks for analysis of the growing rule of non- 
security related private businesses in security governance. 
The present special issue is the result of those fruitful exchanges: a volume that presents the 
views of a diverse group of scholars in terms of disciplines, primary field of research, 
epistemological and ontological approaches, academic seniority, institutional affiliation, and 
nationality, in addition to offering original case studies on the specific roles of non- security 
related private companies of all sizes, areas of businesses, and geographic origin. The special 
issue is composed of six articles, grouped into two sections. The first section explores how 
public and private security roles are being re-conceptualised within current trends in security 
governance. By deconstructing the mainstream discourse on the efficiency of public-private 
collaborations, this section underlines the diversity of security governance arrangements, as 
well as the recurrent absence of shared priorities and strategies between public and private 
actors. This section is formed of three articles: the first one, authored by Carrapico and 
Farrand, is entitled ‘Dialogue, Partnership and Empowerment for Network and Information 
Security: The Changing Role of the Private Sector From Regulation Adopters to Regulation 
Shapers‘; the second article, written by Bossong and Wagner, focuses on ‘Cybersecurity and 
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Public-Private Partnership – a clarification of roles and interactions in the context of the EU’; 
and the third one, produced by Bures, is titled ‘Contributions of Private Businesses to the 
Provision of Security in the EU: Beyond Public-Private Partnerships‘.  
The second section further explores current security governance by analysing the diversity of 
security arrangements, which include not only Public- Private Partnerships (PPPs), but also 
state-based arrangements and fully privatised arrangements, often co- existing within the 
same territory. This section not only documents existing PPPs, but it also maps the evolution 
of these fast-changing relations and asks who is in the driving seat of such arrangements. If 
the public sector is no longer rowing, is it at least still steering? The existence of such 
diversity leads us to re-think the idea that globalization and its impact on the security 
environment and market have resulted in the homogenisation of security governance and 
the approximation of security actors‘ practices (Waltz, 1999). Furthermore, this second 
section also analyses the consequences of diverse security arrangements for different areas 
of activity. In particular, it analyses, firstly, the societal and political outcomes of tasking non- 
security related businesses with security responsibilities, and, secondly, the consequences of 
having traditional state sectors become increasingly dependent upon private capabilities and 
resources. This section is composed of three articles: the first one, which is authored by 
Aarstad, is entitled ‘Maritime Security and Transformations in Global Governance’; the 
second one, written by Biaumet, focuses on ‘The sentinel and the rebel. Multi-choice 
policing in Burundi and the state-centered approach of security sector reform ‘; and the final 
article, by Saldivar and Price, is on ‘The Social and Political Impact of the New (Private) 
National Security: Securitization of immigration in the United States Post 9/11‘. 
The remainder of this introduction to the special issue seeks to expand on the main themes 
and trends of these two sections by starting with an analysis of the sectors and roles that are 
currently being outsourced to private companies beyond PMSC. It then turns to how we can 
begin to conceptualise such trends and concludes with a discussion on the consequences 
that could emerge from this form of privatization.  
What Is Outsourced to Private Companies beyond PMSCs? 
This special issue extends the conceptual and theoretical arguments in the emerging body of 
literature on security provision beyond PMSCs, that indicates that the bulk of private 
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companies’ security roles and practices falls under the label of the so-called critical 
infrastructure. While there is still some debate about what makes a particular infrastructure 
critical to the extent that its incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating effect on 
national security, there is a consensus that much of it is owned and/or operated by the 
private sector (Dunn Cavelty, 2010). Due to the privatization and deregulation of the public 
sector since the 1980s and the globalization processes since the end of the cold war, the 
private sector controls 85% of the critical infrastructure in most Western countries (The 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004). This concentration 
is based on two factors: 1) the perception that the private sector is better placed to 
efficiently manage different sectors of activity, including security ones, thanks to its 
organizational structure and existing expertise (Braithwaite, 2008); and 2) the enlargement 
of the concept of critical infrastructure, which evolved from being equated with military 
structures to being associated with more diverse forms of infrastructure such as economic 
ones (Dunn-Cavelty and Kristensen 2008).  
According to O’Rourke (2007), the lists of critical infrastructures have continuously increased 
since the 9/11 attacks, with key aspects now including agriculture and food systems, energy 
systems, health care facilities, banking and finance systems, commercial facilities and 
shipping services, most of which are currently privately owned2. As a consequence, 
representatives of public security agencies in several Western countries have started to 
increasingly call upon private companies to participate in the management of various 
national security issues, with an overall political aim of considerably reducing security risk 
and making the entire society more resilient and resistant to all kinds of threats, natural 
disasters and man-made catastrophes (Barrinha and Carrapico, 2016; Bures this issue, 
Carrapico and Farrand, this issue). According to the former US Secretary of Homeland 
Security Janet Napolitano, for example, “homeland security … requires not just a ‘whole of 
government’, but a ‘whole of nation’ approach. In some respects, local law enforcement, 
community groups, citizens, and the private sector play as much of a role in homeland 
security as the federal government” (cited in Petersen 2013, 1).  
                                                          
2 Authors such as Bossong, however, critically point out that despite the gradual expansion of the concept of 
Critical Infrastructures, such expansion has not automatically been reflected in operational programmes (2014).  
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Several sociology experts consider such statements to be a sign of a larger trend of 
“responsibilization” whereby individuals, communities, private businesses and other non-
state actors “at risk” are increasingly expected to accept substantial responsibility for their 
own safety and security (Beck 1992; Garland 2001). As such, security becomes more 
individualized and market-oriented, whereby “responsible individual and corporate behavior 
entails installing burglar alarms and surveillance systems, engaging the services of a security 
company, participating in neighbourhood watches, and other forms of non- or quasi- state-
related security behavior” (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011, 67). This trend also explains why 
contemporary criminological analyses commonly point to the fragmentation and blurring of 
the security sector, where public and private actors interact in the provision of security 
(Shearing and Wood 2003; Wood and Dupont 2006). While the specifics vary among critical 
infrastructures, as well as national frameworks, the articles in this special issue confirm that 
some degree of security pluralisation is clearly discernable across both the specific 
infrastructures and across national boundaries.  
It is therefore important to clarify at this point what we mean by security provision by non-
security companies. Following Bures’ contribution to this special issue, we argue in favour of 
focusing primarily on those provisions and/or practices of security that are 1) intentional 
(e.g. not mere by-products of other business activities); and that 2) directly and/or indirectly 
address the level of (in-)security in a given environment. As in the case of PMSCs, security 
provision by non-security companies is also inherently political in the sense that it involves 
activities that impact the perception and/or provision of security, which has been 
traditionally conceptualized as a public (rather than private or club) good. In contrast to 
PMSCs, however, not all security provision by non-security companies can be described as 
voluntary. Moreover, unlike the proactive security engagement that is typical of both public 
security agencies and PMSCs, non-security companies have several other options at their 
disposal when it comes to responding to various security threats: 1) Business termination; 2) 
Taking the security risks and running the business as usual; and 3) Transferring the costs 
related to the threat’s occurrence by purchasing insurance (Bures, this issue).  
Conceptualizing Private Security beyond PMSCs: Public-Private Partnerships 
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In addition to disagreements concerning the impacts and implications of security 
pluralisation in general, and the growing security role of private companies in particular (see 
below), social sciences experts share a common challenge when it comes to improving the 
conceptual basis of their positions and arguments. In contrast, public policy-makers have 
primarily attempted to push for a greater security role of private companies under the rubric 
of public-private partnerships (PPPs), which have emerged as a particularly popular option in 
the last decade (Bossong and Wagner, this issue; Bures, this issue; Bursh and Givens 2012; 
Carrapico and Farrand, this issue; Verkuil 2007). Albeit originally conceived in the field of 
administrative reform, in the 1980s, with the dual aim of de-bureaucratize public services 
and promote privatization (Minow 2003; Ortiz 2010), the concept of PPPs was subsequently 
utilised within the then new concept of critical infrastructure protection in the 1990s. It was 
presented as a way to reduce the vulnerability of vital systems to low-probability, yet high-
consequence, new security threats (Collier and Lakoff 2008). Since 9/11, the popularity of 
PPPs has risen to the point that they have been described by public officials as the third leg 
in counterterrorism – the first two being intelligence and surveillance (or technology) 
(Petersen 2008, 408).  
Several articles in this special issue, however, suggest that the actual security performance 
of security-related PPPs is subject to debate. For example, Bures (2016) argues that PPPs do 
not always automatically produce the expected win-win solutions, neither for the public nor 
for the private sector, as there is a dissonance between the “better safe than sorry” logic of 
public security agencies and the “profit first” logic of private companies. As a consequence, 
unless imposed by command (via legal and/or technical regulations at both the national and 
international level which, however, fundamentally contradict the non-hierarchical nature of 
PPPs), some private companies are likely to pursue different options from the ones followed 
by public agencies, which are tasked with ensuring the maximum possible level of security.  
 
The degree of dissonance between the security logic and the market one, however, is not a 
static one and is bound to vary considerably according to the area under analysis. As 
Carrapico and Farrand argue, the relations established between the public and private sides 
of PPPs in the field of Network and Information Security have evolved considerably over 
time and so has the perceived dissonance. Companies such as Internet access providers and 
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online service providers have moved from a passive role, as objects of regulation, to an 
active one, firstly as actors responsible for adopting regulations, and later as shapers of such 
regulations. Although there is still some concern expressed over such dissonance, the 
authors clearly indicate that the market logic has spilled over the security one, resulting in 
the private sector being largely influential within PPPs in this field, which could have serious 
consequences at the level of their security performance.  
 
Bossong and Wagner explore a similar line of enquiry by studying how PPPs are diversely 
articulated in the area of cyber security. Their article provides a conceptual mapping of the 
different forms and kinds of PPPs in the area of cybersecurity, especially in so far as it 
concerns more regular and publicly known forms of cooperation arrangements in this area, 
differentiating partnerships from other forms of horizontal coordination or co-regulation 
between public and private actors. Such distinction allows for a more nuanced 
understanding of PPPs, underlying how different communities of practice are associated to 
different normative concerns and priorities, thus contributing to a more advanced 
conceptualization of the relations between public and private actors in the area of cyber 
security.  
 
Jointly, the first three articles in this special issue suggest that at least within the European 
Union, the majority of existing examples of genuine public-private cooperation primarily 
concern cyberspace. This is primarily due to the fact that most cyber security issues 
transcend not only the public-private divide but also the national borders, thus making most 
of the national/public security governance measures obsolete. As such, in Bourdieu’s terms 
(1977, 1998), cyber security is arguably a rather unique field in terms of the distribution of 
material, cultural and symbolic capital among public and private actors. Thus, more than in 
other types of critical infrastructures, where public actors are still often the ones with 
superior cultural and symbolic capital and thus are able to set the rules of the game via legal 
and/or technical regulation, their actual performance in cyber security often depends on 
what Bourdieu (1998, 76-77) called having “the feel for the game”, e.g. “the actor’s ability to 
comprehend their place within the field and the relative distribution of forms of capital 
within it” (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011, 105). According to both Bossong and Wagner 
(this issue) and Carrapico and Farrand (this issue), private actors in cyber security often have 
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the upper hand because when dealing with new or advanced cyber threats, public actors 
often enter the public-private partnerships as the weaker partner, reliant on specialised IT 
companies to define both the level of vulnerability and appropriate countermeasures.  
 
New Security Arrangements and Their Conceptualizations beyond PPPs 
 
As PPPs appear to underplay the significant costs related to the adoption and 
implementation of security policies by non-security private companies, academic experts 
have recently pondered about alternative conceptual frameworks that may be more suitable 
for explaining the apparent gap between the security-maximizing logic of public security 
agencies and the profit-maximizing logic of private companies. For example, in the area of 
counterterrorism, where “[p]revention, detection and reporting are carried out by private 
partners, while the public partners have an analytic and repressive task,” (Verhage 2008, 9) 
several security studies experts suggested that we are witnessing the emergence of new 
types of security arrangements. Building on Foucault’s notion of space,3 Wesseling described 
the European Union’s fight against terrorism financing as “a network of all private and 
public, national and international actors that are responsible for standard setting, decision-
making, implementing and/or monitoring the EU’s measures to combat terrorism finance” 
(Wesseling 2009, 2). Similarly, Parker and Taylor suggested that we are witnessing the 
emergence of “a new security paradigm in which financial borders and parameters are best 
understood as a ‘complex assemblage’ in which private financial institutions are in effect, 
authorized to make security decisions” (Parker and Taylor 2010, 953, also see Abrahamsen & 
Williams 2011). 
The articles included in this special issue make empirical and conceptual contributions to this 
growing literature on new security arrangements. Regarding the empirical contribution, 
Aarstad’s article challenges several common wisdoms regarding current maritime 
governance arrangements. This author argues that due to several recent shifts in private and 
public governance capabilities in this domain (primarily related to the proliferation of armed 
private security provision), public actors nowadays facilitate security governance by carving 
                                                          
3 According to Foucault, the notion of ‘space’ does not imply a fixed geographical area, it is rather a constructed 




out privileged spheres for commercial industries through their convening capacities, 
regulatory infrastructure and legitimizing role. This new role as facilitators signals a 
departure from the classic governance jargons ‘rowing’ and ‘steering’, as it does not 
necessarily imply a sense of control and direction. In particular, the agenda-setting capacities 
of private actors testify to a re-articulated role for public actors that is centered around 
convening resources, implementing consensual decisions through the existing regulatory 
infrastructure and casting a shield of legitimacy on the arrangement and the actors involved. 
Thus, according to Aarstad, the facilitation by public actors of private actors’ participation in 
the governance arrangement surrounding private maritime security denotes both an active 
and passive reaction to changes in the globalized security environment in order to remain 
relevant in contemporary security politics.  
Biaumet’s article offers an intriguing case study of two grassroots policing arrangements in 
Burundi - the use of informal ‘sentinels’, guarding virtually every commercial and domestic 
buildings in the capital city, and the reconversion of former bandits into security guards in 
palm oil fields. Their existence challenges the Western notions of ‘security governance’ and 
‘security sector reform’ and suggests that in post-conflict settings, at least two types of 
‘security governance’ coexist – a global security assemblage backboned by donors' 
discourses on state empowerment and involving coordination processes between formal (or 
growingly formalized) actors of security; and the local self-policing arrangements falling de 
facto out-of-scope of any public management. While some recent conceptualizations of 
security sector reform formally depart from state-centered views of security governance, the 
case study of Burundi suggests that implementation on the ground still resists holistic 
approaches of security.  
In their article, Saldivar and Price use Securitization Theory to make sense of the evolution of 
immigration policies in the United States in the aftermath of 9/11 terrorist attacks. They 
argue that securitization was rendered possible through the perceived threat posed by 
immigration to national identity and security, with increasing numbers of Americans citizens 
worrying about the social cohesion of American culture and about potential terrorist attacks. 
While mostly focusing on the various impacts of the securitization of immigration (see 
below), these authors also discuss the crucial role of powerful private actors when it comes 
to their encouraging of a more securitised state (motivated by primary profit) and their 
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pushing of the public sector towards a growing reliance on the private prison industrial 
complex.   
Finally, Bures explored two alternative conceptual frameworks for analysing the gap 
between the security-maximizing logic of public security agencies and the profit-maximizing 
logic of private companies: political corporate social responsibility (PCSR) and resilience. The 
former comprises a growing number of publications whose authors seek to “normatively 
prescribe, and positively describe and explain, the political duties and activities of 
corporations” (Whelan 2012, 711). In particular, PCSR highlights the relative decline of 
political and socio-economic steering capacities of Westphalian territorially-bound nation-
states vis-à-vis the (global) business actors, which in turn leads to the blurring of traditional 
boundaries between the political, economic and civil spheres of society.  
The latter concept of resilience is a contested one, but it usually takes into account that 1) it 
is impossible to guarantee the full protection of all critical infrastructure given its sheer size 
and the enormous costs that it would involve, and 2) even the best security measures 
sometimes fail. Its proponents therefore argue that more emphasis should be put on the 
recovery from all kinds of disasters so that the damaged infrastructure can be readily and 
cost-effectively restored (Pursiainen 2009, 728). As such, according to Bures (this issue), it 
may be more acceptable to private companies, whose profit motive makes them very 
interested in getting their businesses restored and running as soon as possible following any 
disruption of their production.  
Consequences of Security Provision beyond PMSCs 
While there appears to be a general agreement across social science disciplines that a 
pluralization of security is taking place, there is considerable disagreement about its impact 
and implications. On the one hand, in much of the global governance literature pluralization 
of security is presented largely in positive terms as part of a broader shift from government 
to governance, because the traditional hierarchical conceptions of government are seen as 
inadequate when it comes to capturing the geographically, functionally, normatively and 
institutionally dispersed structure of security provision (Reinicke and Deng, 2000; Bruhl, 
2001). In contrast, various non-hierarchical governance arrangements are viewed positively 
as presenting numerous opportunities for productive cooperation of multiple actors, 
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including private companies, in the provision of security and other traditionally state-
provided goods and services (see Boerzel and Risse 2006 for a literature review). Similarly, in 
line with the aforementioned claims by public officials, security governance experts have 
also pointed out that in response to the emergence of recent security threats, there has 
been a turn towards new modes of security governance that include a hybrid mix of public 
and private actors, which rest upon non-hierarchical networks, and rely on soft compliance 
based on instruments such as peer evaluations or best practices (Gill 2006; Krahmann 2005; 
Webber et al. 2004). Because of their flexibility, relative independence from national 
governments, as well as their ability to include a broad range of participants on equal 
footing, it is generally assumed that these informal policy structures “are more suitable for 
tackling governance problems or achieving common goals than more hierarchical and formal 
strategies” (Den Boer, Hillerbrand and Nölke 2008: 118). Such perceived adequateness 
usually derives from the conceptualization of emerging security threats as more fluid and 
networked- based, which makes them less susceptible to traditional State responses 
(Carrapico et Al, 2015).  
On the other hand, several security, sociology and criminology experts have expressed a 
rather negative view of the increasing pluralization of security in general, and of the growing 
role of private sector actors in particular. Primarily, this is due to concerns about the 
repercussions on the provision of security, traditionally conceived as a public good provided 
by states to all citizens, and/or concerns about the lack of public accountability, oversight, 
and legitimacy of private sector actors (Krahmann, 2005; Singer, 2003). In the conflict 
resolution literature, this critical view is pervasive in numerous studies that investigate the 
role of private companies in contemporary armed conflicts. Their authors almost 
unanimously conclude that in areas of weak or failing governmental authority, private 
companies are often contributors to security problems, rather than to their solutions 
(Ballentine and Sherman 2003; Berdal and Malone 2000; Klare 2001; Musah 2002). 
Moreover, many of the intriguing questions that have been asked concerning the 
implications of the increasing utilization of services of private military and/or security 
companies (PMSCs) in the security studies literature are particularly relevant in the context 
of this special issue. Namely, how does the growing participation of companies whose 
primary line of business is not security provision impact on the development and running of 
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security policies? Such question implies concerns about depoliticization and 
commodification of security: as it becomes a commodity capable of being globally exported 
as a set of technical capabilities and skills, it is increasingly transformed from a political 
problem requiring welfare social policy and state intervention to a technical problem 
amenable to private solutions through the logics of cost efficiency (Abrahamsen & Williams 
2011).  
Overall, therefore, the existing literature not only points out the growing presence of the 
private sector in security related activities and critical infrastructures and the consequent 
transfer of responsibilities from the public sector to companies – it also underlines the 
expanding neo-liberal approach to security governance, based on a reduction of risk, a 
perception of the private sector as being more efficient and adequate to deal with recent 
security threats, and a responsibilization of all sectors of society for collective security. These 
issues have been further explored by a growing critical literature on neo-liberalism and its 
restructuring of security governance (Price 2011; Harvey 2007; Abrahamsen and Williams 
2011a; b). According to this literature, the mainstreaming of neo-liberal economic policies, 
the consequent commodification of security and the latter’s refashioning as an expertise- 
dominated field have led to the belief that the private sector is better placed to deal with 
security threats and risks given its high degree of efficiency. Furthermore, private businesses 
have also emerged as sites of expertise in their own fields, putting them at an advantage, in 
relation to the State, when dealing with issues of insecurity (Barrinha and Carrapico, 2016). 
This literature voices, however, serious concerns in terms of the private sector’s priorities 
and their incompatibility with the traditional public security and safety priorities of the State 
(Price 2011).  
In this special issue, the political, economic and social consequences of this transfer of 
responsibilities from the public sector to the private one are highlighted in very different 
areas. Carrapico and Farrand refer to tangible consequences in the area of cyber security 
where the privacy and data security of Internet users has been put at risk due to a lack of 
prioritisation of encryption and other security measures. Saldivar and Price argue that the 
increasing management of the United States’ prison industrial complex by private actors has 
contributed substantially towards the securitization of immigrants and rendered their 
integration process more difficult. Having benefitted from the state of exception rationale 
14 
 
enabled by the War on Drugs, the private prison system reinforced its own role by lobbying 
political actors for harsher immigration legislation in view to increasing its profits. Biaumet’s 
case study on Burundi suggests that in a transitioning context, where different agents and 
normativities – namely the government, the police, corporate security actors, donor states 
and institutions, individuals, transnational norms on (private) security and local dynamics – 
are intertwined in the provision of security, discrepancies between donor discourses and 
local dynamics remain at work. To a certain extent, these discrepancies reflect the 
theoretical debate over the state’s role in security governance, particularly in post-conflict 
contexts where concerns about democratic oversight, the rule of law and accountability 
abound. 
Finally, Bures’ article surveyed three key general challenges of the growing role of private 
businesses in the provision of security – responsibilization, depoliticization, and 
commodification. These are important reminders that the engagement of private businesses 
in the provision of security is always bound to raise a number of profound political 
dilemmas, which imply the need for (re-)consideration of the more traditional regulatory 
frameworks in order to safeguard important public goods and/or values. Moreover, since 
private companies can actually decide not to provide particular security goods and/or 
services if their provision is deemed unprofitable, there is a clear need for public alternatives 
for the provision of such security goods and/or services available to all citizens at all times. 
Avenues for Future Research 
As noted above, the key aim of this special issue is to widen the existing debates on security 
privatization by looking at how and why an increasing number of private actors beyond 
PMSCs have come to perform various security-related functions. It is therefore important to 
conclude this introduction by acknowledging that there is considerable room for further 
research going beyond the ground covered in in this special issue, both conceptually and 
empirically speaking. We would therefore like to encourage further research on the new 
private actors that are participating in security governance and on the different 
arrangements that have emerged between those private actors and the public sector. Some 
of this still to-be-explored ground was covered by other participants in our workshop, at the 
British International Studies Association annual conference in London. We would therefore 
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like to offer here a summary of these insights regarding 1) the types of actors and areas of 
security, and the 2) conceptual frameworks covered by these unpublished contributions, as 
indicators of plausible future avenues of research.   
The paper by Hendrik Hegemann explored a number of these avenues for further research. 
In particular, it looked at the participation of private actors in EU civil security governance via 
two innovative case studies: the EU security research programme and EU guidelines for 
integrated risk assessments (Hegemann, 2015). The author’s research suggested a need to 
investigate different types of private actor involvement, extending beyond the more 
traditional concepts delegation, co-regulation and public-private-partnerships. In civil 
security governance in the EU, where the goal is neither to formally regulate the behaviour 
of private actors nor to award independent security functions to them, but to draw on the 
specialised experience and knowledge they have gained, this specifically includes 
consultation, information exchange, and provision of research funding. Conceptually, these 
arrangements highlight the plausibility of application of concepts of ‘new’ or 
‘experimentalist’ governance to the security field with the aim to use the scientific state of 
art to develop innovative policy solutions that ‘work’ and serve the goal of ‘better 
regulation’ beyond the intricacies of ideological politics (Nance and Cottrell 2014, Seibel and 
Zeitlin 2010).  The author also suggests that there is a potential value to the concept of 
‘orchestration’ given that international organizations often play a special role in these modes 
of governance: they ‘orchestrate’ private actors based on their cross-national overview of 
relevant expertise in order to leverage their limited powers and resources and increase their 
autonomy and authority vis-à-vis sceptical states (see Abbott et al. 2015). 
William Vlcek looked into the privatization of security in the domain of global finance and 
analyzed the long process that has emerged in the production of money laundering as a 
crime and the increased application of economic sanctions as a tool for maintaining global 
peace and security (Vlcek, 2015). His research shows that financial firms and a variety of 
non-financial economic actors are now responsible for surveillance against money 
laundering and terrorist finance along with the enforcement of economic sanctions, and in 
particular US economic sanctions. He specifically focused on the numerous consequences 
stemming from the transfer of this obligation to protect society from the state to private 
financial actors, along with the responses to government measures enforcing the 
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privatization of financial surveillance. This rational response can be framed as an example for 
‘riskification’ (see Cory 2012), the identification of financial activities and actors that present 
a high risk as subjects for future financial sanctions and the termination of all business 
transactions with them. In turn, one unintended consequence from this rational action is to 
leave these activities and actors outside the global financial system and its financial 
surveillance mechanisms. As a result, according to Vlcek, the privatisation of financial 
surveillance may force illegality beyond the scope of that surveillance and circumvent its 
original objective. 
Sarah Komasova explored the concept of airport security and functions of its existing 
structures at different airports, with primary emphasis on the role, interactions and 
divergent approaches of public and private actors (Komasova, 2015). In the centre of her 
inquiry is the question of how the concept of airport security, including its parts and 
components, is understood and practiced, and how this understanding and practice are 
influenced by the presence of private actors. She adopts Marc Salter’s understanding of 
airport security ‘in terms of passenger, baggage, and airport employees screening; perimeter 
and sterile area access; and terminal security’ (Salter 2008, 4). In this view, the important 
actors of airport security are the following: state, airport company shareholders represented 
by airport management, state employees and serviceman, private security subcontractors 
and their employees, relevant airlines personal and travellers, further airport buildings and 
procedures, technology and ideas of security and risk management. In theoretical terms, 
Komasova’s inquiry primarily builds on actor-network theory and its methodological 
emphasis on field research, or more precisely, going to the sites of airport security 
production. In her research project, she is analysing three cases of existing airports security 
arrangements, each with different interactions between public and private actors, in order 
to provide a comparative analysis.  
Pawel Frankowski and Irma Słomczyńska explored the growing presence of the private 
sector in space, building a comparative study between companies in the United States and 
Europe (Frankowski and Słomczyńska, 2015). The conference paper problematised the 
private sector’s approach to data protection and licencing by focusing on privately 
developed technology such as satellite imagery and satellite remote sensing. The authors 
also discussed the consequences of this growing presence for global security by asking 
17 
 
whether an increased reliance on private capabilities, in a traditional area of state activity, 
could lead to the emergence of new security threats. One of the particularly interesting 
aspects of this paper was the mapping of security arrangements in an empirical area that has 
so far received limited attention. Through their comparison between the US and Europe, the 
authors uncovered evidence of different security arrangements: in the US, private security 
companies’ shape legislation and policy directly, whereas in Europe, the process is still 
mainly in the hands of the state sector.  
Going beyond this special issue, there is a considerable range of actors, both private and 
public worthy of further exploration. It is the case, namely, of international organisations, 
which play an important role as brokers for many public-private arrangements. The 
aforementioned concept of orchestration may offer new insights in this respect since it 
involves IGOs enlisting intermediary actors on a voluntary basis, by providing them with 
ideational and material support, to address target actors in pursuit of IGO governance goals. 
Both the intermediary and target actors may include private businesses and via 
orchestration, the IGO creates, supports and integrates a multi-actor system of soft and 
indirect governance geared towards shared goals that neither orchestrator nor 
intermediaries could achieve on their own (Abbott 2015). Furthermore, as this special issue 
pointed out, different policy areas are characterised by different arrangements and, as such, 
this literature would considerably benefit from expanding the limited range of policies 
covered so far. Although a lot of these arrangements have been referred to as PPPs, their 
shape and division of labour can vary widely. We would also like to encourage further 
research on the political, social, and economic consequences of such arrangements and on 
the conceptual frameworks used to explain these new arrangements. One such framework 
this new research agenda could engage with is the nodal governance perspective (see Wood 
and Dupont, 2006), which has already been successfully utilized for grappling more explicitly 
and systematically with the ‘messy realm of practices and relations’ (Garland 1997: 199) 
between public and private actors in criminology. Some of the topics we believe would also 
be worth expanding upon are the development of private actors’ expertise in this field, how 
it is framed in the context of security governance, and the insights it reveals about the 
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